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State Dept. review completed

NSC review completed

1 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, NIC

THROUGH: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM: Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on BCW Arms Control, Scheduled for 1430 hours,
5 October

Purpose of Meeting

1. This meeting will take up two issues:

- how to deal with reported Soviet activities which may be in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): and
- U.S. policy regarding chemical weapons (CW) arms control.

The strategy paper for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) arms control is at TAB A, and we recommend that you read it.

BW Convention

2. With regard to the BWC, the meeting will focus on next steps to be taken following the Stoessel press conference last week and the most recent demarche to the Soviets which is to be delivered today. A copy of Stoessel's remarks is at TAB B and the demarche is at TAB C. The demarche addresses two issues:

- the reported outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk; and
- evidence of the use of mycotoxins by communist forces in Southeast Asia.

3. An intelligence summary of Soviet BW capabilities and the Sverdlovsk incident is at TAB D. On the diplomatic front, the U.S., and later the British have requested consultations with the Soviets. Our most recent demarche was made in Moscow, in June 1981, in the context of a general demarche on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements not related to SALT. To date, the Soviets have refused to consult and have not provided any information to allay our concern.

4. A resume of intelligence on communist use of mycotoxins in Southeast Asia is at TAB E and a detailed DIA analysis of the vegetation sample reportedly exposed to a CW attack near the Thai-Kampuchean border is at TAB F.

DIA review(s) completed.

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U.S. CW Policy

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6. A UN group of experts formed last year to look into reports of BW and CW use in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea has reached no firm conclusions. The group has requested on-site inspections but no decision has yet been made. A brief summary of the work of the UN group is at TAB H.

Talking Points

7. Talking points on intelligence issues are attached to this memorandum. For your information, a report on the last BW IG meeting is at TAB I.

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